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IN DEFENSE OF TITLE IX: WHY CURRENT
POLICIES ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
JOCELYN SAMUELS
&
KRISTEN GALLES*
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
On July 11, 2003, the Office for Civil Rights of the United States
Department of Education ("Department") issued a Further Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance.1
The document represents the denouement of a year-long process set in motion
by the Secretary of Education's appointment of a Commission on Opportunity
in Athletics (the "Title IX Commission" or "Commission") to re-evaluate the
application of Title IX's requirement that men and women be provided equal
opportunity to participate in athletics.2 The 2003 Clarification reaffirms the
validity and effectiveness of longstanding administrative regulations and
policies governing this application.
This article outlines the long history of repeated, but failed, attacks on
Title IX, including the Title IX Commission report itself. It also explains how
the Department's reaffirmation of existing Title IX athletic policies was the
only legally appropriate conclusion to the year-long debate. These policies,
which have been in effect for more than two decades, clearly reflect
congressional intent in enacting Title IX and have been upheld by every
federal court of appeals that has considered them. 3 Moreover, they are fully
*. Jocelyn Samuels is Vice President and Director of Educational Opportunities at the National
Women's Law Center. Kristin Galles is a civil rights attorney is Alexandria, Virginia and co-chair of
the ABA's Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section's Committee on the Rights of Women.
1. Letter from the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Further Clarification
of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance (July 11, 2003)
[hereinafter 2003 Clarification Letter]. The complete text of the 2003 Clarification Letter is included
within this publication.
2. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §1681 et seq. (2000).
3. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (lst Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155
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consistent with, and necessary to, the goal of Title IX to remedy longstanding
and continuing systematic discrimination against women and girls who want
to participate in educational athletics. 4
Part I of this article describes the Title IX athletic policies and focuses in
particular on the "three-part test" applied by the Department as the court to
evaluate equality of participation opportunities. Part II explains why these
policies are both necessary and appropriate implementations of basic Title IX
requirements. In particular, Part II(A) demonstrates how the policies clearly
reflect Congress' intent to remedy persistent discrimination against women.
Indeed, Congress has repeatedly rejected attempts to weaken Title IX's
application to athletics as set forth in the regulation and policies. Part II(B)
explains the consistent judicial interpretation of Title IX, upholding the
athletics policies against attack and rejecting claims that they impose unlawful
quotas or result in discrimination against men. Part II(C) shows why the
policies are still necessary to reach true equality of opportunity on the playing
field. Finally, Part III addresses some of the policy changes recommended in
the Title IX Commission's majority report and explains why those changes
would have been unlawful as a matter of statutory interpretation and unwise as
a matter of policy.
The goal of this article is to outline the flexibility of the Title IX athletic
policies, to demonstrate how opponents of Title IX continue to recycle old
arguments in new ways, and to provide defenders of Title IX with the
information and arguments necessary to rebut future attacks.
I. THE TITLE IX ATHLETICS REGULATIONS AND POLICIES ARE FLEXIBLE
AND FAIR.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits federally funded
education programs and activities from engaging in sex discrimination. It says
(1st Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Cohen I], cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Miami Univ. Wrestling
Club v. Miami Univ. of Ohio, 302 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2002); Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 292 F.3d
1042 (8th Cir. 2002); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000); Boulahanis v. Bd. of
Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999); Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999);; Homer v.
Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265 (7th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995); Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168 (3d
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1043 (1994); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824
(10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578
(W.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 1993).
4. The policies also, importantly, advance the goals and requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
[Vol. 14:1
IN DEFENSE OF TITLE IX
simply: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance .... -5 Title IX's prohibition against sex discrimination is
very broad, applying to most elementary and secondary schools, colleges, and
universities. 6 The law applies to every aspect of a federally funded education
program or activity, including athletics.
The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW")
promulgated final regulations to implement the statute in 1975. 7 The athletics
components of those regulations require that educational institutions (1) offer
male and female students equal opportunities to participate in sports; (2)
allocate athletic scholarship dollars equitably; and (3) treat male and female
students equitably in all aspects of athletics, including with regard to
equipment and supplies; locker rooms, facilities, and practice areas;
scheduling of games and practices; medical and training services; publicity;
and assignment and compensation of coaches. This article discusses only the
first component -equal athletic participation opportunities.
The general Title IX athletics regulation mandates that:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or
otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and
no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis. 8
The specific regulation governing equal participation opportunities,
unchanged since 1975, states:
A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate,
club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for
members of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities
are available, the Director will consider, among other factors:...
Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
6. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982). "There is no doubt that 'if we
are to give [Title IX] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its
language."' Id. (citations omitted).
7. Upon its creation in 1979, the Department of Education assumed responsibility for
enforcement of Title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 3441 (a)(3) (2000). The Department of Education adopted the
Title IX regulations originally promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
virtually unchanged. Department of Education Organization Act, 45 Fed. Reg. 30,802 (May 9, 1980)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106.41). See N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 516, nn.4-5.
8. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 1(a) (2002).
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sexes .... 9
After receiving hundreds of discrimination complaints from student
athletes, HEW issued a Policy Interpretation on Title IX and Intercollegiate
Athletics on December 11, 1979,10 to clarify "the meaning of 'equal
opportunity' in intercollegiate athletics. [The Policy Interpretation] explains
the factors and standards set out in the law and regulation which the
Department will consider in determining whether an institution's
intercollegiate athletics program complies with the law and regulations.""' I
The Policy Interpretation established the "three-part test" as a means of
measuring equal participation opportunities. The test provides three "valid,
alternative way[s]"' 2 that schools can show that they provide students of both
genders with equal opportunities to participate in sports. Under the three-part
test, the Department evaluates:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male
and female students are provided in numbers substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are under-
represented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can
show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is
demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the
members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing
practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can
be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that
sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present
program. 13
9. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (emphasis added).
10. HEW published a draft policy on "Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics" in the Federal
Register. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Proposed Policy Interpretation, 43 Fed.
Reg. 58,070 (Dec. 11, 1978) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86). The Department received and
reviewed more than 700 comments before issuing its final Policy Interpretation one year later. Title
LX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; Title IX and Intercollegiate
Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,423 (Dec. 11, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86) [hereinafter Title
IX: A Policy Interpretation].
11. Title IX: A Policy Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 71,414.
12. 2003 Clarification Letter, supra note 1, para. 7.
13. Title IX: A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418C(5)(a). Notably, the three-part test
is not gender specific. It does not speak in terms of males and females but in terms of the "under-
[Vol. 14:1
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If a school can meet any one of these three prongs, the Department will find it
in compliance with Title lX's equal participation requirements. As the
Department recognized in its 2003 Clarification Letter, this three-part test "has
worked well" and provided substantial flexibility to schools. 14 Indeed, in
many ways, the three-part test quite generously favors schools.
The first prong of the test effectively provides that if every female student
has the same chance of participating in athletics as every male student, then
the school will be found to be providing equal athletic participation
opportunities. For example, if a school has 1,000 students (500 males and 500
females), but offers only 500 athletic participation opportunities, that school
will comply with Title IX's participation requirements if it offers 250 of those
opportunities to males and 250 of those opportunities to females. Each male
and each female will then have an equal 1 in 2 chance of playing sports. If the
school instead creates 300 slots for males and only 200 slots for females, then
each male student will have a 3 in 5 chance of playing sports while each
female will have only a 2 in 5 chance of playing. The school would thus be
giving male students preferential treatment by giving them a greater
opportunity to participate in athletics.
In the sex-segregated world of athletics, where males and females do not
compete for the same program slots, the law recognizes that where schools
meet this first prong, they are offering truly equal opportunity. Yet, even if a
school does not offer equal opportunity, the Department will still find it in
compliance under the second prong of the three-part test if the school has a
history and continuing practice of program expansion for members of the
underrepresented sex. This prong represents an exceptionally and atypically
generous standard for measuring civil rights compliance. In no other civil
rights scheme of which the authors are aware are institutions deemed in
compliance with a nondiscrimination mandate if they can demonstrate simply
that they have made incremental progress toward equality. Nonetheless, if a
school has an equity plan and regularly accounts for the growing interests and
abilities of the underrepresented sex, then it will be deemed in compliance
with Title IX under prong two.
Even if a school fails to offer equal opportunity and fails to make progress
toward it, the school can comply under the third prong of the test if it meets
the interests and abilities of the underrepresented gender (i.e., if female
students are not interested in more opportunities to play sports). In practice,
the third prong often constitutes a significant "chicken and egg" barrier for
represented gender." It is most frequently applied to females because they are the under-represented
gender at most schools because of the history of discrimination against them.
14. 2003 Clarification Letter, supra note 1, para. 7.
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female athletes. How can they develop their interests without exposure or
opportunity? To prove their interests and abilities, female athletes often have
to pay to develop their own opportunities in ways their male classmates and
male predecessors never had to do. They must work to find other females who
want to play, find coaches and facilities on their own, find competition to play,
pay for their own uniforms and equipment, arrange their own schedules, and
provide their own transportation. Only after years of taking such
extraordinary actions and "paying to play" are they able to challenge schools
under prong three. Thus, in practice, the three-part test often works to enforce
a less-than-equitable status quo.
In 1996, the Department's Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") issued a
Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part
Test to further explain the flexible nature of the three-part test. 15  That
Clarification Letter "provided schools with a broad range of specific factors
and illustrative examples to help schools understand the flexibility of the
three-prong test." 16 Among other points, the 1996 Clarification Letter makes
clear that:
. Schools may comply with the three-part test under any prong of the
test; ' 7
. The "substantial" proportionality standard of the first prong of the
test does not require "strict" proportionality, and evaluation of
proportionality will be made on a case-by-case basis, not by use of a
statistical test; 18
- In evaluating compliance with the substantial proportionality
standard, schools must count "actual benefits provided to real
students," and cannot count for participation purposes slots that are
15. Letter from the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996), available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) [hereinafter
1996 Clarification Letter]. In 1995, the Department circulated a draft of the 1996 Clariication Letter
to 4,500 interested parties for comment, and incorporated and responded to comments before
releasing the 1996 Clarification Letter in final form. Id. para. 3.
16. Id. para. 10.
17. In recognition of the use of the term by courts interpreting the three-part test, the "Dear
Colleague" letter issued to accompany the 1996 Clarification Letter stated that the first prong of the
test would be a "safe harbor" for Title IX compliance. 1996 Clarification Letter, supra note 15, para.
8. The phrase is a descriptive legal term of art that carries no legal consequence. The 2003
Clarification Letter confirms that "each of the three prongs of the test is an equally sufficient means
of complying with Title IX, and no one prong is favored." 2003 Clarification Letter, supra note 1,
para. 8.
18. 1996 Clarification Letter, supra note 15, para. 12.
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theoretically available but are unfilled; 19
; The focus of the second prong of the test is on "whether the
program expansion was responsive to developing interests and
abilities of the underrepresented sex" -not on setting "fixed intervals
of time within which an institution must have added participation
opportunities." 20
. A school will be found to have failed to fully accommodate the
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex under the third
prong of the test only where there is "(a) unmet interest in a particular
sport; (b) sufficient ability to sustain a team in the sport; and (c) a
reasonable expectation of competition for the team." 21
The 1996 Clarification Letter also makes clear that schools are permitted,
but not encouraged, to meet proportionality standards by reducing the
opportunities available to the over-represented gender. 22  In its 2003
Clarification Letter, the Department confirmed that "nothing in Title IX
requires the cutting or reduction of teams in order to demonstrate compliance
with Title IX, and ... the elimination of teams is a disfavored practice." 23
In the 2003 Clarification Letter, the OCR "strongly reaffirm[ed] ... its
commitment to equal opportunity for girls and boys, women and men[;] '" 24
reiterated the terms of the three-part test; and incorporated the "broad range of
specific factors, as well as illustrative examples," 25 of the 1996 Clarification
Letter to help schools understand the flexibility of the current law. The 2003
Clarification Letter makes clear that:
. "[T]he three-prong test has provided, and will continue to provide,
schools with the flexibility to provide greater athletic opportunities for
students of both sexes[;] ' '26
, Each prong of the three-part test is a "viable and separate means of
compliance[;],, 27
. "[T]he elimination of teams is a disfavored practice," and "OCR's
19. Id. para. 14.
20. Id. para. 19.
21. Id. para. 30.
22. Id. para. 15.
23. 2003 Clarification Letter, supra note 1, para. 11.
24. Id. para. 16.
25. Id. para. 10.
26. Id. para. 15.
27. Id. para. 9.
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policy will be to seek remedies that do not involve the elimination of
teams[;]" 28
. OCR will "aggressively enforce Title IX standards, including
implementing sanctions for institutions that do not comply[;] ' 29
m "[P]rivate sponsorship of... teams will continue to be allowed[,]
[but]... does not in any way change or diminish a school's
obligations under Title IX[;]" 30 and
m "OCR will ensure that its enforcement practices do not vary from
region to region." 31
In sum, the three-part test provides maximum flexibility for schools of all
sizes and budgets. By civil rights standards, it quite generously favors
schools. Accordingly, as set forth below, the test has survived numerous
challenges over the years.
THE ATHLETICS REGULATIONS AND POLICIES ARE NECESSARY AND
APPROPRIATE TO IMPLEMENT TITLE IX REQUIREMENTS.
A. The Legislative History of Title IX Shows that the Athletics Regulations
and Policies Properly Implement Congressional Intent.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 was enacted to remedy
persistent discrimination against women and girls and to throw open the doors
of educational opportunity for them. Before Title IX, women and girls were
routinely excluded from educational opportunities solely on the basis of sex.
Some public schools and universities barred women and girls entirely. Others
required them to meet higher admission standards than their male classmates
or set quotas that limited the number of women admitted. Once admitted,
many of these women and girls were segregated into "female" study areas and
were excluded from certain "male" pursuits, like "shop."
The situation for girls and women in athletics was even worse. In 1971-
1972, more than twelve times as many boys played high school sports than
girls (294,015 girls compared to 3,666,917 boys).32 Similarly, only 31,852
28. Id. para. 11.
29. 2003 Clarification Letter, supra note 1, para. 12.
30. Id. para. 13.
31. Id. para. 14.
32. National Federation of State High School Associations, Athletics Participation Survey Stats,
at http://www.nfhs.org/partsurvey99-00.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2003).
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women, compared to 172,447 men, played college sports.33 Women received
only 2% of schools' athletic budgets and virtually no athletic scholarships. 34
Before Title IX, many states did not sanction sports for high school girls at all.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) also sponsored only
men's sports.3 5 Few structures existed for the promotion of athletics for girls
or women. Females were simply not allowed in the gym or on the field.
These limitations had lasting effects on women's lives. Former House
Representative Patsy Mink told Congress that she was denied admission into
medical school solely because she was female. 36 Her daughter was similarly
denied admission to Stanford University because it had already reached its low
quota for women. 37 These experiences led Representative Mink to law school
and to Congress, where she vowed to pass a law that would open doors that
had been closed to women and girls.3 8 Representative Mink joined Senator
Birch Bayh and Representative Edith Green in championing the law that
became Title IX. 39
Prior to the enactment of Title IX, Congress spent little time discussing
application of the law to athletics.40 Starting almost immediately after its
passage, however, Congress was besieged by proposals to restrict the reach of
Title IX and to cabin athletics from equal opportunity requirements. 4 1 In May
1974, for example, Senator John Tower (R-TX) introduced a bill to exclude
from Title IX any sport that produced gross revenue or donations for a
school.42 Congress rejected the amendment and instead passed an amendment
introduced by Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY), which directed HEW to issue
regulations that contained, "with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities,
reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports."43  The
amendment made it absolutely clear that Congress intended Title IX to cover
33. Dep't of Educ., Achieving Success Under Title IX, ED.GOV, at
http://www.ed.gov/pubs/TitleLX/part5.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
34. The Secretary of Education's Commission on Opportunity in Athletics, "Open to All, " Title
IX at Thirty (Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Open to All]. The complete text of Open to All is included
within this publication.
35. Kay Hawes, Women's Sports Enter NCAA Arena, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 6, 1999, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991206/active/3625n32.html.
36. 145 CONG. REC. H6400 (daily ed. July 26, 1999) (statement of Rep. Mink).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893.
41. Id.
42. 120 CONG. REc. 15,322-23 (May 20, 1974); S. CONF. REP. No. 93-1026, at 4271 (1974).
43. Sex Discrimination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484.
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athletic programs at educational institutions.
In 1974 and 1975, HEW promulgated, proposed, and then finalized
regulations to implement Title IX, including with regard to athletics. 44 At that
time, federal law required that HEW submit the regulations to Congress for
review and comment before they could be implemented.4 5 Congress then had
forty-five days to pass a joint resolution rejecting the regulations in whole or
in part. More particularly, the regulations would go into effect "unless the
Congress shall, by concurrent resolution, find that the standard, rule,
regulation, or requirement is inconsistent with the act from which it derives its
authority and disapprove such standard, rule, regulation, or requirement.
46
The procedure was designed to determine "if the regulation writers have read
[Title IX] and understood it the way the lawmakers intended it to be read and
understood. '47 Thus, unlike the regulatory process today, in 1975 Congress
had the express opportunity to decide whether the proposed regulations
properly reflected its intent in passing Title IX.
Congress took this review and comment opportunity seriously. It held
extensive hearings on the regulations, for which many interest groups provided
testimony and comment.4 8 The NCAA,49 the College Football Coaches
Association, and other organizations that represented the interests of men's
sports testified and fought to change the regulations or to amend the law itself.
Their supporters in Congress offered no fewer than nine resolutions and bills
to reject the athletic regulations, to exclude athletics from Title IX altogether,
44. HEW published proposed regulations in 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228 (June 20, 1974), and
received nearly 10,000 comments on them, most related to athletics. HEW issued its final regulations
one year later. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (June 4, 1975) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 86).
45. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 531-32. Section 431(d)(1) of the General Education
Provisions Act, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 567, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (2000). This
provision was intended "to afford Congress an opportunity to examine a regulation and, if it found the
regulation 'inconsistent with the Act from which it derives its authority. . . .' to disapprove it in a
concurrent resolution. If no such disapproval resolution was adopted within 45 days, the regulation
would become effective." N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 531-32. Although a similar
requirement for congressional approval was later invalidated by the Supreme Court, that holding does
not undermine the weight of Congress' approval of the regulations at issue here. See I.N.S. v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 921-22 (1983).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1).
47. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Postsecondary
Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) (statement of Rep. O'Hara, Chair
of the Subcommittee).
48. See id; Hearing on H.R. Con. Res. 330 Before the House Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities
of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong. (1975); Prohibition of Sex Discrimination: Hearings
Before the Senate Subcomm. on Educ. of the Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 94th Cong. (1975).
49. At that time, the NCAA governed only men's sports. Women's sports were run by a separate
organization, the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW).
[Vol. 14:1
2003] IN DEFENSE OF TITLE IX
and/or to exempt "revenue producing" sports from the reach of the law. 50
Proponents of these bills and resolutions complained that complying with
the athletic regulations would be unduly burdensome and would harm existing
men's programs, especially revenue producing sports like football. 51 Sponsors
of the resolutions similarly claimed that the regulations were inconsistent with
Title IX itself and would impose unlawful quotas for women's sports.
In response, the prime sponsors of Title IX and others made clear that the
challenged regulations correctly interpreted Congress' intent with regard to
athletics. As Representative Mink noted, the detractors were simply re-
arguing their opposition to the law itself rather than to the substance of the
regulations.52 She summarized her opponents' position as follows:
The implication is that sex discrimination is acceptable when someone
profits from it and that moneymaking propositions should be given
congressional absolution from Title IX. In this argument, the NCAA
is disagreeing with the law, not the regulation. Our purpose here is
not to re-legislate. Rather, it is to determine if the regulation is
50. Both houses of Congress considered and rejected a number of resolutions, all calling for
disapproval of the HEW regulations in whole or in part. Among those resolutions were: S. Con. Res.
46, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC. 17,300-301 (1975) (introduced by Senator Helms (R-NC), stating
that the Title IX athletics regulations were inconsistent with the statute); S. Con. Res. 52, 94th Cong.,
121 CONG. REC. 22,940 (1975) (introduced by Senator Laxalt (R-NV), stating that the regulatory
requirement for proportionality in athletics scholarships imposed quotas in violation of the law); H.
Con. Res. 310 & H. Con. Res. 311, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC. 19,209 (1975); H. Con. Res. 329 &
H. Con. Res. 330, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC. 21,687 (1975). The House Subcommittee on Equal
Opportunities unanimously recommended that the House reject House Report Concurrent Resolution
330. 1975 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 665.
Bills were also introduced simultaneously to amend Title IX itself. See H.R. 8394, 8395, 94th Cong.,
121 CONG. REC. 21,685 (1974) (proposed amendment to Title LX to allow schools to use money from
revenue-producing sports exclusively or initially on those sports, regardless of gender inequities in
program as a whole); S. 2106, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REc. 22,778 (1975) (Tower amendment
seeking to exempt revenue-producing sports from Title IX altogether); S. 2146 (amendment
introduced by Senators Bartlett, Hruska, and Helms to prohibit the application of Title IX to
athletics).
51. Senator Hruska expressly noted his desire to protect college football and Title IX's perceived
impact on men's sports. 121 CONG. REC. 22,169-71 (1975).
52. Congressional testimony on House Concurrent Resolution 330 demonstrated that opposition
to the regulations was really opposition to the law itself and its demand for equity in athletics, because
the very notion of sharing athletic resources with women was perceived as a loss by men.
Those of us who have worked directly with school administrators have often heard the same thought.
"We can't take anything from the boys' program and there's no money to develop one for girls." Of
course, when boys have had virtually all of the money and facilities, sharing will be difficult. Going from
preferential treatment to equal treatment will be something of a shock.
Hearing on H. Con. Res. 330 Before the House Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the Comm. on
Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong., 58 (1975).
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consistent with the law we passed 3 years ago.53
Representative Mink acknowledged the tension between men's major and
minor sports and women's sports, especially during tight budget conditions. 54
Nonetheless, she rejected complaints that the regulations would harm men's
football or basketball, emphasizing instead that:
We cannot in good conscience continue to allow our educational
institutions to deny women and girls the educational opportunities that
have been the assumed right of their brothers. The Title IX regulation
provides a start in the direction of providing equal educational
opportunity regardless of sex. I urge the Congress to demonstrate its
commitment to equal educational opportunity by allowing the Title IX
regulation to take effect in its entirety on July 21, 1975.55
The Executive Branch concurred with this interpretation. In his testimony,
the then-Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Caspar Weinberger,
made clear that the plain language of the statute required that Title IX's
coverage be very broad and apply to athletics, noting that if Congress had
intended athletics to be the only educational program excluded, it could have
easily said so. 56
In rejecting attempts to limit the scope of Title IX or to weaken the
provisions of the regulations, Congress expressly considered arguments that
requiring equal opportunity in athletics would impose quotas, result in reverse
discrimination against men, or conflict with the terms of the statute.
Congress' action makes clear that the drafters of the regulations had "read
[Title IX] and understood it the way the lawmakers intended it to be read and
understood. 57
Despite this ratification of the regulations, opponents continued to mount
challenges to implementing the law's equal opportunity requirements for
53. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Post-Secondary
Educ. of the Comm. on Educ.& Labor, 94th Cong. 166 (1975) (Statement of Rep. Mink).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 167. Senator Birch Bayh, the original Senate sponsor of Title IX, also testified before
the same House committee and before the Senate Subcommittee on Education, urging them to reject
any resolutions to weaken the regulations. Id. at 168. See also Prohibition of Sex Discrimination:
Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Educ. of the Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 94th Cong.
46(1975).
56. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Post-Secondary
Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong. 438 (1975) (statement of Caspar Weinberger,
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare). Congress recited this testimony in passing the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687. S. REP. No. 100-64, at 9-10 (1987).
57. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ. of
the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) (statement of Rep. O'Hara, Chair of the
Subcommittee).
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athletics. In 1976 and 1977, some lawmakers again tried to amend Title IX to
alter or eliminate its application to athletics. 58 Again, these attempts failed.
59
Thus, while individual lawmakers may have supported the positions of Title
IX's opponents, Congress as a whole repeatedly rejected them and upheld
Title IX and the Title IX regulations as currently written.
Once the Department issued its Policy Interpretation in 1979,60 individuals
began to file discrimination complaints in earnest. But before the Department
could fully address those complaints, several schools mounted judicial
challenges to Title IX's application to athletics. They argued that only those
education programs or activities that directly received federal funds should be
subject to Title IX's non-discrimination requirements, thereby opening the
door for discrimination in all other areas. 61 Four years later, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed in Grove City College v. Bell.
62
In 1987, Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act to reverse
Grove City and to make clear that it had always intended the civil rights
statutes, including Title IX, to apply institution-wide. 63 Under that Act, now
incorporated into Title IX, if any part of an educational institution receives
federal funds, then all of its programs and activities must comply with the
law. 64 In amending the statute, Congress reaffirmed its prior positions on Title
IX and its goal of achieving equity in all educational programs and activities,
including athletics. 65 In fact, the debate on the Civil Rights Restoration Act
expressly cited the need to apply Title IX to athletics to remedy discrimination
against female athletes.66 Indeed, "the record of the floor debate leaves little
doubt that the enactment was aimed, in part, at creating a more level playing
field for female athletes." 67 Congress thus confirmed the strong message it
had sent when the regulations were first promulgated -that those regulations
and, by 1987, the 1979 Policy Interpretation explaining them- correctly
58. Senate Bill 2657, introduced by Senator McClure to limit the definition of "education
program or activity" to "the curriculum or graduation requirements of the institutions," 122 CONG.
REC. 28136 (1976), defeated on the Senate floor, 122 CONG. REC. 28,147 (1976); S. Res. 535, 95th
Cong. (1977) (introduced by Senator Helms to prohibit the application of the Title IX regulations to
athletics).
59. 122 CONG. REc. at 28,147.
60. Title IX: A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,413. See discussion in Section 1, supra.
61. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
62. Id.
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1687.
64. Id.
65. See S. REP. No. 100-64.
66. Id. at 11. See also numerous legislative history cites referenced in Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894.
67. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894.
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reflected Congress' intent with regard to Title IX's application to athletics.
After nearly twenty years of noncompliance, female athletes finally started
enforcing their rights through federal lawsuits in the early 1990s. 68 They were
resoundingly successful. Schools and interest groups responded by again
trying to change the law. In the mid-1990s, the College Football Coaches
Association, the National Wrestling Coaches Association, and many other
groups representing men's sports went to Congress to try to convince it, again,
to amend Title IX and overturn the three-part test.69 As it did in the 1970s,
Congress again listened carefully and held numerous hearings. 70 Fully briefed
on the terms of the three-part test, Congress asked OCR to issue "updated
policy guidance to institutions of higher education, which includes specific
criteria clarifying how such institutions" could demonstrate compliance with
the second and third prongs of the test. 71 The OCR did so, issuing the 1996
Clarification Letter, discussed in greater detail in Section I, supra. Even
though by then Congress was well-aware of the Department's position on
equal athletic participation and the courts' interpretation of Title IX -including
universal approval of the three-part test- it refused to make any changes in the
law.72
The above discussion of the history of Title IX demonstrates that the same
arguments have repeatedly been made to challenge Title IX's application to
athletics and that Congress has understood, adopted, and reaffirmed the
statute, its regulations, and its athletics policies each and every time they have
faced attack. The law, as it currently exists, clearly and unequivocally reflects
congressional intent. For the Department of Education to have made any
changes in those regulations or policies would have thwarted this democratic
process and would have unilaterally changed longstanding policies that have
repeatedly survived all legal and policy challenges.
68. See Franklin, 503 U.S. 60; Cohen, 991 F. 2d 888; Roberts, 998 F.2d 824.
69. See, e.g., Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 103d Cong. (1994); House Subcomm.
on Post-Secondary Educ., Training & Lifelong Learning, 104th Cong. (1995); Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 104th Cong. (1995).
70. Id.
71. Amendment No. 129 to the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996, H.R. 2127, 104th Cong. (1995).
72. Similarly, Congress refused to require colleges and universities to report on any reductions in
participation opportunities or budget cuts planned for their sports teams, recognizing that such a
requirement would represent an unprecedented intrusion into the decision-making processes of
institutions of higher education. See Amendment 608 to the Higher Education Amendments of 1998,
H.R. 6, 105th Cong. (1998) (passed May 6, 1998, deleting reporting requirement).
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B. Consistent Judicial Interpretation shows that the Title IXAthletics
Regulation and Policies are Lawful, do not Impose Quotas, and do not
Discriminate Against Men.
The lawfulness of the three-part test has been considered, to date, by eight
of the twelve federal circuit courts of appeal. 73 Every one of those courts has
rejected challenges to the test and found it to be a lawful, and even
"inevitable," interpretation of Title IX. 74 The United States, on behalf of the
Department, has also recognized the unanimity of opinion on this matter.
75
In upholding the three-part test against statutory and constitutional attack,
courts have consistently rejected three of the most popular arguments of Title
IX opponents: (1) that the three-part test amounts to "quotas" or "reverse
discrimination" against men; (2) that men should have more athletic
opportunities because they are inherently more interested in sports than
women (the so-called "relative interests test"); and (3) that Title IX forces
schools to cut men's teams. These case holdings demonstrate that the three-
part test is not only consistent with Congress' intent in passing Title IX, but
fully lawful as well.
1. The Three-Part Test Does Not Create Quotas or Reverse Discrimination.
Opponents of Title IX have repeatedly claimed that the three-part test
constitutes a gender-based quota system that violates both Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 76 Courts have consistently rejected this claim, recognizing that
the three-part test imposes no numerical requirement remotely analogous to
73. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895, 899; Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 172-73; Williams, 998 F.2d at 170-
71,175; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85; Pederson, 213 F.3d at 877-79; Homer, 43 F.3d at 273-75;
Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 615; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270-72; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at
637-39; Chalenor, 292 F.3d at 1046-47; Neal, 198 F.3d at 770-72; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828.
74. See cases cited supra note 73.
75. See Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Roscoe C.
Howard, Jr., United States Department of Justice, in Support of United States' Motion to Dismiss at
15-16, Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2003) (No.
1:02-CV-00072-EGS)(on file with authors). NWCA's "interpretation of Title IX [alleging reverse
discrimination against men] has been rejected by every federal circuit court of appeals that has
considered the questions plaintiffs raise." Id. The United States has also rejected the claim that the
Department of Education's 1996 Clarification Letter changed the enforcement or interpretation of
Title LX in any way. Id. at 28-30 ("As the text of the 1996 Clarification makes clear, [the Department
of Education] did not 're-open' either the 1980 regulation or the 1979 Policy Interpretation when it
published the Clarification.").
76. See Cohen l, 101 F.3dat 169.
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quotas, particularly in the unique sex-segregated world of athletics. 77
These arguments are perhaps most fully discussed in the challenge brought
by female athletes to Brown University's decision, in the early 1990s, to cut its
women's volleyball, women's gymnastics, men's golf, and men's water polo
teams. 78 The plaintiffs demonstrated that the reduction left men with 63.3%
and women with only 36.7% of the athletic participation opportunities offered
by the school - despite the fact that men represented only 52.4% of the student
body while women comprised 47.6% of the university's undergraduates. 79
Confronting this huge disparity in athletics opportunities, two separate panels
of the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Brown's quota and reverse
discrimination claims.8 0
First, these panels recognized that the concept of a quota is inapposite in
the context of athletics, where schools explicitly establish separate
opportunities for male and female students, who do not compete for the same
slots. Because schools ecreate sex-segregated teams at the outset, they make a
gender-conscious allocation of opportunities in the first instance. Far from
imposing quotas, therefore, the three-part test creates an "unavoidably gender-
conscious comparison [that] merely provides for the allocation of athletics
resources and participation opportunities between the sexes in a non-
discriminatory manner." 81
The sex-segregated world of athletics and Title IX is thus entirely different
from the Title VII world in which males and females compete for the same
jobs or the Title VI world in which members of different racial groups
compete for the same admission slots.82 Without Title IX's three-part test,
77. See, e.g., id. at 170 ("No aspect of the Title IX regime at issue in this case - inclusive of the
statute, the relevant regulation, and the pertinent agency documents - mandates gender-based
preferences or quotas, or specific timetables for implementing numerical goals."); Kelley, 35 F.3d at
271 ("[T]he [Title IX] policy interpretation does not.., mandate statistical balancing.").
78. See Cohen If, 101 F.3dat 161.
79. Id. at 163.
80. Cohen, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Cohen 11, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1186 (1997).
81. Cohen 11, 101 F.3d at 177; see also Neal, 198 F.3d at 772, n.8 ("determining whether
discrimination exists in athletic programs requires gender-conscious, group-wide comparisons ... .
82. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 171, 176-77. The Cohen HIcourt aptly stated,
It is imperative to recognize that athletics presents a distinctly different situation from admissions and
employment and requires a different analysis in order to determine the existence vel non of
discrimination .... [T]he Title VII concept of the "qualified pool" has no place in a Title IX analysis of
equal opportunities for male and female athletes because women are not "qualified" to compete for
positions on men's teams, and vice versa... because gender-segregated teams are the norm in
intercollegiate athletics programs, athletics differs from admissions and employment in analytically
material ways.
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there is a genuine risk that a school will only recruit enough women to fill the
athletic slots it chooses to create, rather than enough women to fill a truly
equitable athletic program.83
Second, the three-part test is not a quota because "the substantial
proportionality test of prong one is only the starting point, and not the
conclusion of the analysis." 84 Schools have three independent ways to comply
with the test -and while schools may, and some do, provide athletic
opportunities to male and female athletes in proportion to their representation
in the student body, the test in no way requires them to do so if they meet one
of the other prongs. The courts clearly recognize that the three-part test offers
three very distinctive options for compliance. 85
Additionally, a Title IX violation cannot be found based solely upon a
disparity in athletic opportunities. A violation will only occur if the plaintiffs
also have unmet interest and ability to play and if the school cannot show that
it has a history and continuing practice of program expansion. As the Cohen
(II) v. Brown University court recognized:
[T]he fact that [Brown] is required to accommodate fully the interests
and abilities of the underrepresented gender [under prong three of the
test], [is] not because the three-part test mandates preferential
treatment for women ab initio, but because Brown has been found
(under prong one) to have allocated its athletics participation
opportunities so as to create a significant gender-based disparity with
respect to these opportunities, and has failed (under prong two) to
show a history and continuing practice of expansion of opportunities
for the underrepresented gender.86
In sum, the three-part test provides a carefully structured, flexible and fair
Id at 177.
83. Id. at 177. See also Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270 ("Congress itself recognized that addressing
discrimination in athletics presented a unique set of problems not raised in areas such as employment
and academics," citing legislative history); Neal, 198 F.3d at 772, n.8 ("[U]nlike most employment
settings, athletic teams are gender-segregated, and universities must decide beforehand how many
athletic opportunities they will allocate to each sex.").
84. Cohen I1, 101 F.3d at 184.
85. Empirical data supports this analysis. More than 70% of colleges that the OCR found to be
in compliance with Title IX during 1994-1998 reached compliance through prongs two or three. In
other words, OCR found them in compliance even though they did not offer equal athletic opportunity
to their female students under prong one. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., No. 01-128, GENDER EQUITY:
MEN'S AND WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 40 (2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dOl128.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). This fact disproves the oft-
repeated claims of Title IX opponents that the only way to comply with Title IX is to adhere to strict
proportionality.
86. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 175.
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way to evaluate whether schools are providing equality of opportunity. It in
no way requires quotas or preferential treatment, and claims to the contrary
have been squarely rejected.
2. The "Relative Interests Test" Contradicts the History and Purpose of Title
IX and Constitutes Intentional Discrimination Based Upon Illegal and
Archaic Gender Stereotypes.
Opponents of the three-part test further claim that women are inherently
less interested in sports than men so that requiring equality of opportunity
artificially inflates the number of women's opportunities. They thus assert
that the benchmark for measuring allocation of participation opportunities
should be students' expressions of interest in participating in sports, not the
civil rights principle of equal opportunity. In other words, schools would be in
compliance as long as they accommodated the relative levels of interest
expressed by men and women -that is, if they "allocate[d] athletic
opportunities to women in accordance with the ratio of interested and able
women to interested and able men, regardless of the number of unserved
women or the percentage of the student body that they comprise."87 Under
this approach, if schools could measure levels of interest and "prove" that men
were twice as interested in participating in sports as women, for example, the
schools would be permitted to allocate available sports opportunities to men
on a two-to-one basis.
Courts have resoundingly rejected this relative interests test, stating that it
would read "the 'full' out of the duty to accommodate 'fully and effectively"'
if a school chooses to comply under the third prong of the three-part test, and
would freeze current discrimination and men's long term head start in sports in
place.88 Moreover, the relative interests approach directly contradicts the first
prong of the test, which requires athletic participation opportunities that are
substantially proportionate to the levels of male and female enrollment, not
expressed interest; it is only that ratio that offers every female student the
same chance to participate in athletics as every male student.
Courts have held that the relative interests test "'cannot withstand scrutiny
on either legal or policy grounds' . . . because it 'disadvantages women and
undermines the remedial purposes of Title IX by limiting required program
expansion for the under-represented sex to the status quo level of relative
interests .... "'89 To allow schools to provide fewer athletic opportunities to
87. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899.
88. Id. at 899-900; Cohen H, 101 F.3dat 174.
89. Cohen 11, 101 F.3d at 174 (citations omitted). See also Homer, 43 F.3d at 274.
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females than males, "based upon the premise that women are less interested in
sports than are men, is (among other things) to ignore the fact that Title IX
was enacted in order to remedy discrimination that results from stereotyped
notions of women's interests and abilities." 90
Fundamentally, the problem with an interest-based test for allocation of
participation opportunities lies in the fact that "women's lower rate of
participation in athletics reflects women's historical lack of opportunities to
participate in sports" -not a lack of interest, which "evolve[s] as a function of
opportunity and experience." 91 As a result,
[S]tatistical evidence purporting to reflect women's interest instead
provides only a measure of the very discrimination that is and has
been the basis for women's lack of opportunity to participate in
sports .... To allow a numbers-based lack-of-interest defense to
become the instrument of further discrimination against the
underrepresented gender would pervert the remedial purpose of Title
IX.92
"Had Congress intended to entrench, rather than change, the status quo - with
its historical emphasis on men's participation opportunities to the detriment of
women's opportunities - it need not have gone to all the trouble of enacting
Title IX." 93
This conclusion accords with basic principles of civil rights law. As the
court in Cohen II noted, "[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned
gender-based discrimination based upon 'archaic and overbroad
generalizations' about women. The Court has been especially critical of the
use of statistical evidence offered to prove generalized, stereotypical notions
about men and women." 94 Indeed, the Supreme Court has made this critique
in the context of Title IX itself. In Cannon v. University of Chicago,95 in
which the Court recognized an implied private right of action to enforce Title
90. Cohen I1, 101 F.3d at 178-79.
91. Id. at 179.
92. Id. at 179-80.
93. Id. at 180-81; see also Pederson, 213 F.3d at 878 ("of course fewer women participate in
sports, given the voluminous evidence that [the school] has discriminated against women in refusing
to offer them comparable athletic opportunities to those it offers its male students"). Indeed, the facts
demonstrate that interest explodes when opportunities are made available on an equitable basis. To
quote just a single statistic, since 1972, when Title IX first opened up opportunities for female
athletes, female participation in high school athletics has skyrocketed by more than 800% while
female participation in intercollegiate sports has soared more than 400%. See Open to All, supra note
34, at 14.
94. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179 (citations omitted).
95. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 681 n.2 (1979).
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IX, the University of Chicago tried to justify its low quota for the admission of
women into its medical school by arguing that few women were interested in
or applied to its medical school.96  The Court rejected that argument,
recognizing "the dampening impact" of discriminatory conduct on interest.97
In fact, "a central aspect of Title IX's purpose was to encourage women to
participate in sports: The increased number of roster spots and scholarships...
would gradually increase demand among women for those roster spots and
scholarships." 98 The Neal v. Board of Trustees court feared that adopting a
relative interests test "would hinder, and quite possibly reverse, the steady
increases in women's participation and interest in sports that have followed
Title IX's enactment." 99
In sum, the "relative interests test," advocated by Brown, the National
Wrestling Coaches Association, and other men's sports advocates, "is entirely
contrary to 'Congress's unmistakably clear mandate that educational
institutions not use federal monies to perpetuate gender-based discrimination,'
and makes it virtually impossible to effectuate Congress's intent to eliminate
sex discrimination in intercollegiate athletics."' 00
3. Title IX Does Not Result in Cuts to Men's Teams, and Men Have Gained,
Not Lost, Opportunities Under Title IX.
Title IX opponents also often claim that its policies have forced reductions
in men's participation opportunities. Courts, however, have consistently
recognized that Title IX policies in no way require schools to limit men's
opportunities, through cutting teams or otherwise. 1 1 Moreover, the evidence
shows that men have actually gained, not lost, athletic opportunities since the
enactment of Title IX.
Most recently, in National Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Department of
Education,102 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed
for lack of standing a lawsuit filed by a coalition of wrestlers alleging that the
Title IX athletics policies had resulted in "reverse discrimination" against
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Neal, 198 F.3d at 768 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 769 (citing Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994), rejecting claim that
differing interests of sexes justified providing women prisoners with fewer educational opportunities
than male prisoners).
100. Cohen 11, 101 F.3d at 176 (citing Cohen, 991 F.2d at 907).
101. See, e.g., Neal, 198 F.3d at 770 (citing Homer, 43 F.3d at 375; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 269;
Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830); Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 638-39; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 n.15.
102. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2003).
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them. In dismissing the case, the court emphatically rejected twin contentions:
that Title IX forces schools to cut men's teams and, as a related matter, that
invalidating or weakening the three-part test would result in restoration of
those teams. 103
In particular, the court made clear that "[t]he Three Part Test cannot be
singled out as a 'substantial factor' motivating the decisions of educational
institutions" 10 4  about their athletics programs and that "multiple
considerations in addition to, and beyond compliance with, the [Three Part
Test] inform the decisions of educational institutions ... to cut men's...
teams," 10 5  including "the desire to achieve a particular competitive level,
availability of athletes with high school competition experience, and spectator
interest." 10 6 According to the court, moreover, the plaintiffs in the case could
not establish "even a 'mere likelihood' that repeal of the Three Part Test"
would result in reinstatement of their teams. 107
Other courts have recognized that budget reductions and constraints are a
reality at many schools and that Title IX must be interpreted to reflect that
reality. While everyone would prefer that schools remedy their past
discrimination and reach equity by increasing female opportunities to the level
males have long enjoyed (and most schools do so), 108 schools with dwindling
budgets cannot always do this. The law allows schools to decide their own
level of commitment to athletics and to set their own budgets. As courts have
reiterated, Title LX does not dictate these choices and is not the cause of these
schools' decision-making; it merely requires that they equitably allocate the
opportunities and resources that they have. 109
The historical, factual record confirms that Title IX is simply not the
103. Id. at 115-16.
104. Id. at 119.
105. Id. at 116.
106. Id. at 113.
107. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
108. The vast majority of schools have complied with the three-part test by adding opportunities
for women rather than by cutting opportunities by men. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 85, at 14.
Even if shrinking budgets or other factors led schools to cut or reduce men's programs in order to
preserve women's programs, moreover, it would not be reverse discrimination against men, but rather
remedial action to end decades or even centuries of favoritism toward men. See, e.g., Cohen 11, 101
F.3d at 184 ("Of course a remedy that requires an institution to cut, add, or elevate the status of
athletes or entire teams may impact the genders differently, but this will be so only if there is a
gender-based disparity with respect to athletics opportunities to begin with .... ).
109. Cohen I1, 101 F.3d at 272; Miami Univ., 302 F.3d at 613; Homer, 43 F.3d at 275; Kelley, 35
F.3d at 272; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 638. In hard budget times, few schools will be able to expand
opportunities for women; since courts are not willing to mandate increased spending, they must allow
schools the flexibility to address their budget constraints.
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culprit for any cuts to men's teams that have occurred. Claims that the decline
in wrestling teams is due to Title IX's policies are especially unfounded.
During the period from 1984-1988, Title IX's application to intercollegiate
athletics was suspended due to the Supreme Court's Grove City decision. In
that four year period, when the three-part test was not in effect, colleges and
universities cut wrestling teams at a rate almost three times as high as the rate
of decline during the twelve years after Title IX's application to intercollegiate
athletics was firmly reestablished by the Civil Rights Restoration Act.
Specifically, from 1984 to 1988, the number of NCAA institutions sponsoring
men's wrestling teams dropped by 53, from 342 to 289. During the twelve
years from 1988 to 2000, the number dropped by 55, from 289 to 234.110
As the foregoing makes clear, there are numerous reasons that schools
choose to eliminate or reduce particular sports opportunities, including
declining interest in specific sports, liability considerations, financial
constraints, and choices about how to allocate budget resources among the
sports teams the school wishes to sponsor.Ill Any attempt to blame Title IX
for a decline in some men's lower profile teams at certain schools must be
rejected.
Moreover, the evidence shows that men overall have gained, and not lost,
opportunities since Title IX was enacted. The number of male high school
athletes increased from 3,666,917 in 1972 to 3,960,517 in 2002, while the
number of male college athletes increased from 170,384 in 1972 to 208,866 in
2001.112 Additionally, the number of men's teams has also increased under
Title IX. While the Title IX Commission heard witness after witness complain
about the reduction in the number of men's wrestling and gymnastics teams in
110. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1982-2001 NCAA Sports Sponsorship and Participation
Rates Report, (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.ncaa.com/library/research/participation-rates/
1982-2002/participation.pdf (last visited July 14, 2003).
111. In fact, there is plenty of room for schools to find ways to reallocate resources within their
men's programs in order to preserve men's teams from cutting or capping. The resources male
athletes receive are unevenly distributed, with football and men's basketball consuming 70% of the
total men's athletic operating budget at Division I-A institutions, leaving other men's sports to
compete for remaining funds. Daniel L. Fulks, Revenues and Expenses of Divisions I and I
Intercollegiate Athletics Programs: Financial Trends and Relationships-i 999 (2000), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/research/iiirev exp/2000/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2003). Of the $3.57
million average increase in expenditures for men's Division I-A sports programs from 1998-2000,
68% of this increase, or $2.46 million, went to football. This exceeds the entire operating budget for
women's Division I sports in 2000 by over $1.69 million.
112. Nat'l Fed'n of State High Sch. Ass'ns (NFHS), 2002 High School Athletics Participation
Survey, NFHS.ORG, at http://www.nfhs.org/Participation/2003/2002 03_Participation.pdf (last visited
Oct. 26, 2003); Open to All, supra note 34, at 13-14. See also U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 85,
at 10-11 (number of male college athletes increased by 11,688 during the period from 1981-82
through 1998-99).
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recent years, it did not hear testimony about the increased number of men's
soccer (up 135), baseball (up 85) or basketball (up 82) teams. 1 13 Indeed, the
gains in men's football alone were sufficient to make up for the loss of
wrestling, gymnastics, and swimming slots within the same period."l 4
C. The Title IXAthletics Policies Are Necessary to Address the Persistent Sex
Discrimination Against Women and Girls in Athletics.
Title IX has opened many doors, and promoted enormous growth in
opportunities, for both girls and women. More than half of all college students
now are women. Medical schools that used to bar or limit the admission of
women are now nearly 43% female, while law schools that once limited
women to 7% of enrollment are now nearly 46% female." 5 In athletics, girls
and women stormed the gym doors that finally opened for them after Title IX.
Today, nearly 3 million girls play high school sports (2,806,998 girls in 2002
vs. 294,000 in 1971-1972), while more than 150,000 women play college
sports (150,916 women in 2001 vs. 29,977 in 1972).116
Yet, despite these gains, thirty-one years after the enactment of Title IX,
girls and women still do not receive equal opportunity to participate in
athletics -or receive equal treatment when they are allowed to play. Women's
athletic programs continue to lag behind men's programs on every measurable
criterion -including participation opportunities, athletic scholarships,
operating budgets, and recruiting expenditures. 117 In Division I colleges, for
example, women represent 53% of the students, but are given only 41% of the
opportunities to play intercollegiate sports, only 36% of athletic operating
budgets, and only 32% of the dollars spent to recruit new athletes. 118 In fact,
female participation in intercollegiate sports remains below pre-Title IX male
participation.19 And while the Title IX Commission heard many witnesses
complain about lost opportunities in men's wrestling and gymnastics, it did
113. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 85, at 13.
114. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 85, at 10-11.
115. Open to All, supra note 34, at 21 (comparing figures for 1972 to 2000).
116. See NFHS, supra note 112. See also Open to All, supra note 34, at 13-14.
117. See generally Fulks, supra note I11.
118. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 1999-2000 NCAA GENDER EQUITY REPORT 20
(2002) [hereinafter GENDER EQUITY REPORT].
119. Id. Women also remain underrepresented in collegiate athletic employment. Only 17.9% of
college athletic directors of women's programs, 12.3% of sports information directors, and 27.8% of
athletic trainers are women. Women are even underrepresented as head coaches of women's teams,
holding only 44% of all college jobs. Linda J. Carpenter & Vivian R. Acosta, 2002 Annual Report of
Women in Intercollegiate Sports, available at http://womenssportsfoundation.org/binary-
data/WSFARTICLE/pdf file/806.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (emphasis added).
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not hear about the even greater losses suffered by women's teams in some
sports -that, for example, the number of women's gymnastics teams cut (100)
has been far higher than the number of men's gymnastics teams cut (56).120
Moreover, while 2,648 male wrestlers have lost college opportunities since
1981, female athletes still receive nearly 58,000 fewer college opportunities
than males. 121 Thus, for every one wrestler who has lost an opportunity in
these tight budgetary times, more than twenty female athletes have been
denied opportunities.
In addition, spending on men's sports continues to increase and dominate
spending on women's sports. In Division I in 2000, for every dollar spent on
women's sports, almost two dollars were spent on men's sports. 122 And in
2000, male athletes received the access and opportunities that athletic
scholarships provide almost 1.5 times as often as female athletes. 123 That
difference amounts to at least $133 million more per year in athletic
scholarships for male athletes than female athletes.
Similar disparities persist at the high school level, where female athletes
have less than 42% of the school-sponsored opportunities to play varsity
sports. 124  Male high school students still receive more than 1.1 million
(40.8%) more athletic opportunities than their female counterparts (3,960,517
boys vs. 2,806,998 girls in 2002). Although national data on expenditures on
boys' and girls' sports programs do not exist at the high school level,
moreover, anecdotal evidence and court cases strongly suggest that they are
not treated equally. 12 5
These facts clearly show that females remain the underrepresented gender
in high school and college sports, and that the playing field is still not level for
them. Strong enforcement of Title IX's current athletics regulation and
policies is critical to continue to move toward true equality of athletic
opportunity.
120. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 85, at 12-13.
121. Id. at 11.
122. GENDER EQUITY REPORT, supra note 118, at 19.
123. Id. at 20.
124. See NFHS, supra note 112. See also Open to All, supra note 34, at 13-14.
125. See, e.g., Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 862
(W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that association's scheduling of six girls' sports, but no boys' sports, in
nontraditional or disadvantageous seasons violates Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause, and state
law); Nanette Asimov, Washington Girls: Softball Diamonds in the Rough, S.F. CHRON., May 26,
2000, at 2 (of sixty-two girls' softball diamonds in San Francisco, not one has a regulation dirt infield,
staked bases, or lined field).
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III. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE ATHLETICS REGULATIONS AND POLICIES
WERE UNLAWFUL AND UNWISE.
Despite thirty years of Congress' steadfast refusal to weaken Title IX's
coverage of athletics, the unanimity of views in the courts that Title IX's
athletics regulation and policies are lawful and appropriate, and the substantial
evidence that systematic discrimination continues to limit the opportunities of
women and girls in athletics, the Secretary of Education created a fifteen-
member commission in June 2002 to reevaluate, and make recommendations
for changes to, those policies. That Commission delivered its final report to
the Secretary on February 26, 2003.
The Commission's composition and process raised concerns from the
outset about the agenda it planned to pursue. First, the Commission's charge
failed to ask the critical question: whether discrimination against girls and
women persists, and if so, how can it be remedied. Instead, the Commission
focused on addressing losses to some men's teams, and thus made no inquiry
into whether Title IX's original goals have been met and, if not, why.
Second, the Commission lacked representatives of important
constituencies, including Division II and Division III schools, junior and
community colleges, or high school athletics programs. In fact, ten of the
fifteen commissioners were from NCAA Division I-A universities (i.e., those
with the largest and most expensive athletic programs with football).' 26 Thus,
even though nearly 7 million boys and girls played high school sports and
fewer than 360,000 played college sports in 2001-2002, not one person
representing the athletics programs of the nation's thousands of high schools
was appointed to the panel.
This omission was not remedied by the testimony the commissioners
received. Very few witnesses from smaller colleges, junior colleges, high
schools, or elementary schools were invited to testify. In fact, only one of the
public hearings addressed high school athletics at all.127 These omissions
reflected the incompleteness of the testimony overall. Moreover, testimony
repeatedly requested by commissioners, such as from the author of the
authoritative report by the General Accounting Office showing that men's
teams and opportunities have increased over time, was not provided.
Third, the Commission was not provided information on -and therefore
was not able to consider- the impact of its recommendations. As a result, the
Commission's final report contains no assessment of the effect of the
recommendations on participation opportunities and scholarships for female
126. See generally Open to All, supra note 34, at 53-56.
127. See id. at 50-52.
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athletes.' 2 8 Because the commissioners were not briefed on the terms of the
Department's 1996 Clarification Letter, moreover, they were unable to
analyze the guidance that was already available in current documents or the
extent to which their recommendations would change existing law. Nor was
the Commission provided any in-depth analysis of the case law that uniformly
upholds current policies. Thus, commissioners, no matter how fair-minded
and well-meaning, were denied the information required to analyze the issues
or to make responsible recommendations.
Finally, the arrangements made by the Commission for the expression of
minority views were insufficient and contrary to fundamental principles of
free expression. Although the Commission authorized inclusion of short
statements of minority views following the recommendations on which there
was dissent, it denied the dissenters any opportunity to include fuller
statements of their rationales or analyses or any statement of their concerns
about the drafting of other sections of the report. 12 9  As a result, the
Commission's final report did not reflect a full statement of the views of each
of the commissioners. In response to their inability to include their positions
in the text of the Commission's report, two dissenting commissioners -Julie
Foudy, Captain of the U.S. national soccer team, and Donna de Varona, an
Olympic champion- were forced to file a separate Minority Report to explain
their concerns. 130 The Secretary of Education declined to accept that Minority
Report as an official Commission submission. 13 1
These flaws and deficiencies in the process and the report resulted in a
number of recommendations for radical, and very damaging, changes to Title
IX athletics policies. As set forth below, had they been implemented, some of
these changes would have undermined basic civil rights principles and
violated Title IX and the U.S. Constitution.
For example, several recommendations (e.g., Recommendations 14-17,
20) would have enabled schools to substantially reduce the number of athletics
opportunities they accorded to their female students by permitting them to
count students and athletes in new ways under the first prong of the three-part
test. One recommendation would have authorized schools not to count athletic
128. See Open to All, supra note 34.
129. See id.
130. Donna de Varona & Julie Foudy, Minority Views on the Report of the Commission on
Opportunity in Athletics, Feb. 2003, [hereinafter Minority Report]. The complete text of the Minority
Report is included within this publication.
131. This refusal made a mockery of the Secretary's promise to consider only "unanimous"
Commission recommendations in evaluating changes to Department policies, since by excluding the
Minority Report, the Secretary effectively deprived himself of any means to evaluate which
recommendations were, in fact, unanimous.
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opportunities they provided to male athletes by enabling schools to exclude
"walk-ons" from their count of athletes -even though those students receive
the actual benefits of sports participation, including coaching, training,
tutoring, equipment and uniforms. Conversely, another recommendation
would have permitted schools to inflate the percentage of athletic
opportunities they gave to women by adding athletics opportunities that were
theoretically available but were not filled by any student. Still, a third would
have excluded "nontraditional" students from the count of those entitled to
equal opportunity, based on the inaccurate and unlawful stereotype that
students over a certain age or students who are parents are not interested in
participating in sports. 132
These recommendations would have fundamentally, and unlawfully,
changed the analytical underpinnings of prong one of the three-part test. As
set forth above, prong one is premised on the principle that a school will have
met Title IX's participation requirements if every student, regardless of
gender, has an equal chance to play sports. To have authorized schools to
pretend that certain students were not playing sports -or to assume that other
students would never be interested in playing sports- would have perverted the
approach of the three-part test: that schools can either provide the equal
opportunity required under prong one or can excuse their failure to do so in the
ways set forth in prongs two and three. These recommendations would have
authorized schools to comply with the proportionality standard without
actually providing equal opportunity to their female students -and without
satisfying any other prong of the three-part test, thus completely undermining
Title IX's guarantee of equal rights.
A similar flaw infected two other recommendations that would have
authorized schools or the Secretary of Education to set "variances" from
proportionality -i.e., uniform percentages by which schools could fall short of
equal opportunity but still be found in compliance with prong one of the three-
part test. 133 By effectively allowing schools to set ceilings on the percentage
of athletics opportunities they would have been required to allot to their
female students, these recommendations would have permitted schools to
comply with Title IX without providing equal opportunity or justifying their
failure to do so.
Recommendation 12, which could have led to the exclusion of teams
funded by private funds from the reach of Title IX, 134 would similarly have
132. See Open to All, supra note 34, at 37-39 (Recommendations 14-17, 20); Minority Report,
supra note 130, at 12-15.
133. See Open to All, supra note 34, at 37 (Recommendation 14).
134. Id. at 36 (Recommendation 12, recommending study of changes to Department rules on
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violated the law. As courts have made clear in this and other contexts, there is
no economic defense to discrimination.135 Nothing in a school's acceptance of
private funds exempts it from its obligation to ensure that students are treated
equally in athletics opportunities offered under its auspices. Once the school
accepts the funds or the in-kind contributions, they become part of the school's
program, thus making the discrimination the school's own. Moreover,
excluding privately funded teams is inconsistent with the purpose of Title IX
because it perpetuates past and continuing discrimination. Because schools
offered only men's teams for so long, men have more of a donor base to fund
teams. Decades of alumni male athletes are ready to donate, while
comparatively few alumni female athletes exist. Allowing men to make
unchecked donations without providing women with comparable teams and
comparable benefits perpetuates this disparity -a disparity caused by the
school's own prior sex discrimination.
Finally, the Commission's recommendations regarding "relative interests"
and "interest surveys"'136 were also flatly inconsistent with the law. As
discussed in detail in Section II(B), supra, allocating athletic participation
opportunities based upon the "relative interests" of the sexes in athletics would
merely have perpetuated existing discrimination and "undermine[d] the
remedial purposes of Title X by limiting required program expansion for the
under represented sex to the status quo level of relative interests." 137 As the
Cohen II court recognized, "Interest and ability rarely develop in a vacuum;
they evolve as a function of opportunity and experience."' 138
In addition, the use of interest surveys to "measure" the purportedly
relative levels of interest suffers from fundamental flaws. Most colleges do
not draw their athletes from their existing student populations. They actively
recruit them for the purpose of playing sports. At the Division I and II levels,
and often at the Division III level, this recruitment is national in scope so that
athletes come from all over the nation and all over the world. Thus, men play
college volleyball in states where high school boys do not, and women play
college field hockey in states where high school girls do not. Because so
many more high school athletes from this national talent pool play sports and
because so few college opportunities are available, any college that starts a
sport and recruits athletes will promptly find those with the interest and ability
funding of teams.)
135. Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1048. "'A school may not skirt the requirement of providing both
sexes equal opportunity in athletic programs by providing one sex more than substantially
proportionate opportunity through the guide of 'outside funding."' Id (citation omitted).
136. See Open to All, supra note 34, at 38-39 (Recommendations 18-19).
137. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 174 (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 179.
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to fill a team. The current large disparity in recruiting dollars between men's
and women's college sports (68% of all recruiting dollars go to recruit male
athletes, while only 32% go to recruit female athletes 139) demonstrates how
much more attention colleges have paid to finding men with the interest and
ability to play sports and bringing them to campus. To assert that interest
surveys of students measure the extent of interest that would exist were
women to be recruited and offered opportunities non-discriminatorily simply
ignores this reality.
Moreover, use of interest surveys as a substitute for prong one of the
three-part test would have violated basic civil rights law by forcing women to
prove that they were entitled to (i.e., interested in) equal opportunity before
being able to receive it. Our nation's civil rights regimen has never depended
-and should never depend- on the results of a popularity contest. In fact, as
history has shown time and time again, women have flocked to fill educational
and employment opportunities opened to them after centuries of belief that
they were either not interested in or "fit" for such roles. This history is the
same for sports, as women and girls overwhelmingly rushed through the doors
that Title IX finally opened for them. To use a sports metaphor from the
movie Field of Dreams, "If you build it, they will come." If schools provide
the opportunities, women and girls will be there to fill them.
In sum, the Commission recommendations that would have modified or
weakened existing law would have imposed adverse consequences on the
women and girls whom Title IX was intended to protect, undermined
longstanding civil rights protections, and violated Title IX and basic equal
protection principles. The Department of Education was right to reject them.
CONCLUSION
Congress, the courts, and the Department of Education have all repeatedly
and uniformly upheld the Title IX athletics regulations and policies, including
the three-part test for measuring equal opportunity in athletic participation. As
set forth above, wrestlers, football coaches, and other advocates for men's
sports have all repeatedly attacked Title IX over the years, tried to persuade
Congress to amend it, and tried to convince courts to invalidate it. Each
attempt has failed.
Congress has clearly and consistently expressed that Title IX's current
regulations and policies -in place for over two decades- accurately reflect its
intent and the remedial purpose of the statute. The judiciary has consistently
affirmed that expression and has uniformly rejected challenges to the law as
139. GENDER EQUITY REPORT, supra note 118, at 20.
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currently written and applied. Each Department of Education, through both
Republican and Democratic administrations, has similarly defended and
maintained the present law.
It is time to permanently end attacks on the Title IX athletics regulations
and policies and to move forward with the unfinished work of the law:
ensuring equal opportunity for women and girls throughout their education,
including in athletics. We hope and expect that the Department will now
focus on strong enforcement of the law -on educating schools about their legal
obligations and on ensuring that those obligations are met, through imposition
of sanctions, if necessary- so that women and girls can finally achieve the
equal opportunity promised them more than thirty years ago.
TITLE IX HISTORY
Year Event Description
1972 Title IX enacted President Richard Nixon signed Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 et seq.) into law on June 23, 1972
1974 Tower Amendment May 20, 1974. Senator Tower introduced an
proposed and rejected amendment to exempt sports that produced gross
revenue or donations from Title IX compliance
determinations. 120 Cong. Rec. 15,322-15,323
(1974). Amendment rejected in committee;
Javits Amendment was approved instead.
In supporting the Tower Amendment, Sen. Hruska
cited a letter from University of Nebraska
president D.B. Vamer, which questioned women's
interest in sports participation. 120 Cong. Rec.
15,340 (1974)
1974 HEW issued draft Title IX June 20, 1974: HEW published proposed Title IX
regulations regulations in Federal Register for notice and
comment. HEW received more than 10,000
comments (most on athletics)
1974 Javits Amendment enacted July 1, 1974: Senator Javits proposed an
alternative to the Tower Amendment. It required
that HEW issue Title IX regulations that included
"with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities,
reasonable provisions considering the nature of
particular sports." Sen.Conf.Rep.No. 1026, 93rd
Cong., 2 nd Sess. 4271 (1974)
1974 First Title IX complaints First Title IX athletics complaints filed with OCR
against University of Michigan, University of
Wisconsin, and University of Minnesota-Twin
Cities
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1975 HEW issued Title IX May 27, 1975: President Ford signed Title IX
regulations regulations
June 4, 1975: HEW submitted Title IX
regulations to Congress. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128
(1975).
The Title IX regulations were set to become
effective as law on July 21, 1975, unless the
Senate and House adopted concurrent resolutions
to disapprove them. Several attempts to
disapprove the regulations - and even Title IX
itself- failed.
At the time, HEW's final education regulations
were subject to congressional review under §431
of the General Education Provision Act. Congress
could reject them within 45 days of their issuance
by enacting a concurrent resolution. The act was
later deemed unconstitutional in 1980.
June 5, 1975: Sen. Helms submitted S.Con.Res.
46 to disapprove the regulations in
their entirety. Died in committee. 121 Cong.
Rec. 17,300 (1975)
June 17, 1975: Rep. Martin submitted H.Con.Res.
310 to disapprove the regulations in
their entirety. Died in committee. 121 Cong.
Rec. 19,209 (1975)
June 17, 1975: Rep. Martin submitted H.Con.Res.
311 to disapprove the athletics
regulations. Died in committee. 121 Cong.Rec.
19,209 (1975)
July 8, 1975: Rep. O'Hara submitted H.Con.Res.
330 to disapprove the Title IX
regulations re self-evaluation, adoption of
grievance procedures, and
maintenance of records. Unanimously rejected in
committee. 121 Cong.Rec. 21,687 (1975).
July 16, 1975: Sens. Laxalt, Curtis, & Fannin
submitted S.Con.Res. 52 to disapprove
Title IX athletics regulations. Died in committee.
121 Cong.Rec. 22,940 (1975)
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"Sex Discrimination Regulations," Hearings
Before the House Subcommittee on Post-
Secondary Education of the Committee on
Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., June
17-26, 1975.
Hearings on H.Con.Res. 330 (Title IX
Regulation), Hearings Before the House
Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities of the
Committee on Education and Labor, 94 th Cong.,
1st Sess., July 14, 1975. The subcommittee
unanimously recommended to the full committee
that it reject the resolution.
1975 Bills to change Title IX Title IX opponents used the debates over the Title
died in committee IX regulations to try to change Title IX itself.
July 8, 1975: Rep. O'Hara introduced H.R. 8394
& 8395 regarding the use of sports
revenues. Bills would have allowed schools to
use money earned from revenue- producing sports
only on that sport or first on that sport, regardless
of inequities. Bills were reported to the full
committee on 12-6 vote. Died in full committee.
121 Cong.Rec. 21,685 (1975)
July 15, 1975: Sen. Tower reintroduced his
"Tower Amendment" from 1974 as
S.2106. ("Tower II"). The bill would have
exempted revenue- producing sports from Title
IX. Died in committee. 121 Cong.Rec.
22,777 (1975)
July 21, 1975: Sens. Helms, Bartlett, & Hruska
introduced S. 2146 to prohibit the
application of the Title IX regulations to athletics.
Died/Defeated.
"Prohibition of Sex Discrimination, 1975,"
Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on
Education of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare on S.2106, 94 th Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 16-
18, 1975. Numerous advocates for men's sports
testified.
1975 Congressional Almanac 661 et seq.
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1975 Title IX regulations July 21, 1975: Title IX regulations became
became effective as law effective as law. The regulations include
provisions re discrimination in athletics. The
regulations gave elementary schools one year and
secondary schools and colleges three years to
come into compliance. Originally published at
45 CFR Part 86, now at 34 CFR Part 106.
General athletics regulation: 34 CFR 106.41
Athletic scholarships regulation: 34 CFR
106.37(c )
1975 HEW Publication: September, 1975: HEW issued "Elimination of
Elimination of Sex Sex Discrimination in Athletics Programs" to state
Discrimination in school officers, superintendents, college and
Athletics Programs university presidents, and others. November 11,
1975: HEW published the guide in Vol. 40 of the
Federal Register
1976 Bill to limit Title IX to S. 2657: Sen. McClure sponsored an amendment
graduation requirement to S. 2657 of the Education Amendments of 1976
programs defeated that would have limited the meaning of "education
program or activity" to "the curriculum or
graduation requirements of the institutions." 122
Cong. Rec. 28136 (1976). Opposition from Sen.
Bayh led to rejection of the amendment. 122
Cong. Rec. 28147.
1976 NCAA law suit NCAA filed a lawsuit to challenge the Title IX
athletic regulation. No changes.
1976 Title IX compliance July, 1976: Title IX compliance deadline for
deadline elementary schools
1977 Bill to remove athletics January 31, 1977: Sen. Helms re-introduced
from Title IX died former S.2146 as S. 535 to again try to prohibit
the application of the Title IX regulations to
athletics. Died/Defeated.
1978 Title IX compliance July 21, 1978: Compliance deadline for
deadline secondary schools, colleges, and universities. At
the time, HEW was investigating nearly 100
complaints of discrimination in athletics.
1978 HEW issued draft Title IX December, 1978: HEW issued draft policy
athletics.policy interpretation on "Title IX and Intercollegiate
interpretation Athletics" for notice and comment. HEW
received approximately 700 comments.
1979 HEW issued final Title IX December 11, 1979: HEW issued final policy
policy interpretation. 44 interpretation on "Title IX and Intercollegiate
Fed. Reg. 71413 et seq. Athletics." Policy Interpretation details factors to
(12/11/1979) consider in assessing Title IX compliance.
1979 Cannon v. University of U.S. Supreme Court held that an implied private
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 right of action exists to enforce Title IX.
(1979).
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1980 U.S. Dept. of Education Title IX oversight transferred to Office for Civil
established Rights of the U.S. Dept. of Education ("OCR");
Title IX regulations transferred to 34 CFR Part
106. 45 Fed. Reg. 30955 et seq. (5/9/1980)
1980 Interim Title IX Manual July 28, 1980: OCR issued Interim Investigators'
Manual re Title IX compliance to investigators in
its regional offices.
1982 OCR Guidance for Letters OCR issued "Guidance for Writing Title IX
of Findings Intercollegiate Athletics Letters of Findings" to
assist investigators in its regional offices
1982 North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. February 28, 1984: U.S. Supreme Court upheld
Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) Title IX regulations that prohibited sex
discrimination in employment.
1984 Grove City v. Bell, 465 U.S. Supreme Court decision held that federal
U.S. 555 (1984) spending clause statutes only apply to those
programs or activities that receive direct federal
financial assistance, effectively ending Title IX
applicability to athletics
1986 Civil Rights Remedies Congress passed the Civil Rights Remedies
Equalization Act Equalization Act in response to the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Atascadero State v. Scanlon,
which held that the Eleventh Amendment barred
suits for monetary damages under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act (a law similar to Title IX)
against state entities in federal court. The CRREA
includes an express waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment as a condition for accepting federal
funds.
1987 Title IX Grievance OCR published "Title IX Grievance Procedures:
Procedures Manual An Introductory Manual" to assist schools with
their obligations under 34 CFR 106.8 regarding
the establishment of a Title IX complaint
procedure and a Title IX officer to receive those
complaints.
1988 Civil Rights Restoration March 22, 1988: Congress passed the Civil
Act of 1987 20 U.S.C. Rights Restoration Act over Pres. Ronald
§1687 Reagan's veto. The act became effective
3/22/1988. It over-rode the Grove City v. Bell
decision by expanding the definition of "program
or activity that receives Federal financial
assistance." Title IX athletics enforcement again
possible. Conforming amendments adopted in
2000. 65 Fed. Reg. 68050 et seq. (Nov. 13, 2000)
1990 Title IX Investigators' April 2, 1990: OCR updated and finalized its
Manual Title IX Investigators' Manual.
1992 Franklin v. Gwinnett February 2, 1992. U.S. Supreme Court decision
County Public Schools, held that Title IX plaintiffs are entitled to receive
503 U.S. 60 (1992) monetary damages for intentional discrimination.
1992 NCAA Gender Equity NCAA published gender equity study re Title IX
Study compliance at its member schools.
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1992-1993 Cohen v. Brown Cohen v. Brown University, 809 F.Supp. 978
University (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1992)
landmark case re equal opportunity in athletic
participation under Title IX
1993 Equity in Athletics September, 1993: Proposed in Senate as S. 1468
Disclosure Act by Sen. Mosley-Braun
Proposed in House as H.R. 921 by Rep. Collins
1993 Roberts v. Colorado State Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F.Supp.
1507 (D.Colo. 1993), affd, Roberts v. Colorado
State Bd. of Agriculture, 998 F.2d 824 ( 10th Cir.
1993)(CSU ordered to reinstate women's softball
team and to treat it equitably)
1993-1994 Kelley v. University of Kelley v. Bd. of Trustees of the University of
Illinois Illinois, 832 F.Supp. 237 (C.D.Ill. 1993), aff'd 35
F.3d 265 (1994) (cutting men's athletic teams did
not violate Title IX or Equal Protection Clause)
1994 Equity in Athletics Congress passed the Equity in Athletics
Disclosure Act, 20 USC Disclosure Act (EADA) which requires
§ 1092 (g) coeducational institutions of higher education that
receive federal student aid and that have
intercollegiate athletic programs to annually
disclose extensive information about those athletic
programs. Many of the disclosures track the Title
IX regulations. The first annual reporting date
was October 1, 1996. See also 34 CFR 668.41 -
668.48, 60 Fed. Reg. 61424 et seq. (Nov. 29,
1995), and 64 Fed. Reg. 43582, 43588 et seq.
(Aug. 10, 1999)
1995 House Title IX hearing May 9, 1995: Rep. Hastert's complaints about
Title IX prompted hearings in the House's
Committee on Economic and Educational
Opportunities, Subcommittee on Post-Secondary
Education, Training, and Lifelong Learning. No
changes were made as a result of these hearings.
In testimony, Asst. Secretary for OCR Norma
Cantu testified that of the 456 OCR cases since
1989, none resulted in the dropping any men's
athletic team.
June 30, 1995: Rep. Hastert letter to Norma
Cantu complaining Title IX athletic participation
opportunities policies; no policy changes resulted
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1995 Dept. of Education's July 27, 1995: Rep. Porter proposed H.R. 2127
Appropriations Act of relating to the 1996 appropriations for the Dept. of
1996 Education. Rep. Hastert submitted an amendment
(after bill went through committee) that forbid
OCR from using funds to enforce Title IX re
equal opportunity in athletic participation against
colleges and universities until OCR provided
more "specific guidance." No changes resulted.
1995 Draft OCR Title IX September 20, 1995: OCR issued draft
Clarification "Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy
Guidance: The Three-Part Test" to explain 1979
Policy Interpretation re equal opportunity in
athletic participation.
1995 Senate Title IX hearing October 18, 1995: Senate Commerce Committee
hearing on Title IX. Main witnesses were Rep.
Hastert and DOE Asst. Secretary for OCR Norma
Cantu. No congressional or regulatory changes
made.
1995-1996 Cohen v. Brown Remand of Cohen v. Brown University, 879
University F.Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), affd in substantial
part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520
U.S. 1186 (1997)
1996 OCR Title IX January 16, 1996. OCR issued final clarification
Clarification of the three-part "effective accommodation test"
first set forth in the 1979 Policy Interpretation.
No congressional or regulatory changes made.
1996 First EADA reports due October 1, 1996: due date for colleges and
universities to make their first EADA disclosures.
1997 OCR policy guidance on March 13, 1997: OCR issued "Sexual
sexual harassment Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, Other Students, or Third
Parties." 62 Fed. Reg. 12034 et seq.
1998 OCR Athletic July 23, 1998: OCR explained the Title IX
Scholarships Policy requirements for the equitable allocation of
Clarification athletic scholarships in a letter to Bowling Green
State University. The letter indicates that the
distribution of athletic scholarships should be
substantially proportionate to the allocation of
athletic participation opportunities (i.e., if men
have 55% of the athletic participation
opportunities, then they should have within 1% or
one full scholarship of 55% of the total athletic
scholarship allocation)
1998 EADA amendment October 7, 1998: Equity in Athletics Disclosure
Act amendment, including Fair Play Act addition
of 20 USC § 1092(g)(4) re reports
2000 Revised OCR policy OCR issued "Proposed Revised Sexual
guidance on sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students
harassment by School Employees, Other Students, or Third
Parties." 65 Fed. Reg. 66092 (November 2, 2000)
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2001 Title IX Legal Manual January 11, 2001: U.S. Dept. of Justice issued
"Title IX Legal Manual"
2002 Title IX Commission Dept. of Education Appointed Title IX
Commission
2003 Title IX resolutions House (Rep. Slaughter) and Senate (Sen. Biden S.
Res. 40) resolutions introduced to reaffirm Title
IX
2003 Title IX Commission February, 2003: Title IX Commission majority
and minority reports issued
2003 Dept. of Education July 11, 2003: Further Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance
Regarding Title IX Compliance (response to the
Title IX Commission reports)

